Diese unter der Leitung der Proff. Dres. Theophanopúlu-Kontú, Magulás und Charalampákés angefertigte, fleißige und umsichtige Diss. einer Gymnasiallehrerin, die sich dafür vier Jahre unbezahlten Urlaub genommen hatte, ist – nach zwei alten Arbeiten Maidhofs (1920 und 1931) – die erste systematische Behandlung der Rückwanderer im neugriechischen Wortschatz (im Folg.: RW). Die Verfasserin (Verf.) hat sich bestens in die internationale Literatur zu den aus einer Sprache A stammenden, in eine oder mehrere andere Sprachen (B, evtl. C usw.) entlehnten und schließlich in (...) ein jüngeres Stadium von A zurückentlehnten Wörter eingearbeitet: Ihre Literaturliste (S. 265–273) umfasst nicht weniger als 146 griech., engl., französ., italien., deutsche und türk. Titel. Das Thema ist für das Gesamtgriechische von besonderem Interesse, da während seiner so besonders langen und gut dokumentierten Existenz naturgemäß eine erkleckliche Zahl von Lexemen zurückgewandert sind, offensichtlich mehr als in jede andere Sprache Europas. So hat denn die Verf. nach eigener Angabe 170, realiter ca. 200 solche RW zusammengestellt und deren Geschichte meist ausführlich und überzeugend dokumentiert und damit ein Kapitel neugriechischer Etymologie geschrieben. Sinnvollerweise hat sie dabei auf eine Behandlung der immer uferloser werdenden gräkogenen Internationalismen in Technik und Wissenschaften verzichtet und sich auf das Alltagsvokabular beschränkt. Dass jedoch auch eine erste derartige Sammlung nicht annähernd vollständig sein wird, liegt auf der Hand; so ergänzt der Rezensent (im Folg.: R.) ohne langes Suchen folgende Fälle neuzeitlicher RW (nach Sprachen, aus denen sie zurückgekommen sind; vermittelnde Sprachen, etwa Latein, werden hierbei gewöhnlich weggelassen). (shrink)

Die Arbeit an diesem wichtigsten Wörterbuch der gelehrt(er)en mittelalterlichen Gräzität schreitet erfreulich zügig voran: Mit dem vorliegenden Fasz. 4 (= Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Byzantinistik, Bd. VI/4) ist bereits die erste Hälfte des Werkes abgeschlossen; er enthält auf 257 höchst inhaltsreichen Seiten den Rest des Zeta (1 Seite), die drei „kleinen“ Buchstaben Eta, Theta und Iota (13, 33 bzw. 28 S.) und auch schon das gesamte Kappa (182 S.); die Anzahl der Lemmata liegt bei eindrucksvollen 12.000.

I was surprised to note the critical tone of the discussion which my friend Leonard B. Meyer recently devoted in these pages to an article on the relation of art and science that I wrote for a popular scientific magazine. For I had believed all the while that in my article I was merely presenting to a general scientific audience a watered-down version of what I thought were Meyer's own views. Evidently I was mistaken in that belief, though I have (...) been unable to fathom just where I went wrong in interpreting Meyer's earlier writings, which, more than any other source, are the provenance of my ideas about the nature of art. Gunther S. Stent, professor of molecular biology at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Molecular Biology of Bacterial Viruses, Phage and the Origin of Molecular Biology, Molecular Genetics: An Introductory Narrative, The Coming of the Golden Age: A View of the End of Progress, and many important scientific papers. In Concerning the Sciences, the Arts—AND the Humanities" , Leonard B. Meyer took issue with views expressed by Professor Stent in "Prematurity and Uniqueness in Scientific Discovery," published in Scientific American. (shrink)

The monist approach to the ancient mind-body problem styled "neurophilosophy" put forward recently by Patricia Smith Churchland on the basis of latter-day advances in the neurosciences is philosophically inadequate because it does not deal with the ethical dimension of the mind. Keywords: brain, complementarity, free will, mind-body problem, neuroscience, reductionism CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

DBS Think Tank IX was held on August 25–27, 2021 in Orlando FL with US based participants largely in person and overseas participants joining by video conferencing technology. The DBS Think Tank was founded in 2012 and provides an open platform where clinicians, engineers and researchers can freely discuss current and emerging deep brain stimulation technologies as well as the logistical and ethical issues facing the field. The consensus among the DBS Think Tank IX speakers was that DBS expanded in (...) its scope and has been applied to multiple brain disorders in an effort to modulate neural circuitry. After collectively sharing our experiences, it was estimated that globally more than 230,000 DBS devices have been implanted for neurological and neuropsychiatric disorders. As such, this year’s meeting was focused on advances in the following areas: neuromodulation in Europe, Asia and Australia; cutting-edge technologies, neuroethics, interventional psychiatry, adaptive DBS, neuromodulation for pain, network neuromodulation for epilepsy and neuromodulation for traumatic brain injury. (shrink)

Hence, there is still controversy over which of the two versions of the deduction deserves priority and whether indeed any distinction between them can be maintained that would go beyond questions of presentation and involve the structure of the proof itself. Schopenhauer and Heidegger held that the first edition alone fully expresses Kant's unique philosophy, while Kant himself, as well as many other Kantians, have only seen a difference in the method of presentation.

The paper is concerned with Quine's substitutional account of logical truth. The critique of Quine's definition tends to focus on miscellaneous odds and ends, such as problems with identity. However, in an appendix to his influential article On Second Order Logic, George Boolos offered an ingenious argument that seems to diminish Quine's account of logical truth on a deeper level. In the article he shows that Quine's substitutional account of logical truth cannot be generalized properly to the general concept of (...) logical consequence. The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to introduce the reader to the metamathematics of Quine's substitutional definition of logical truth; second, to make Boolos' result accessible to a broader audience by giving a detailed and self-contained presentation of his proof; and, finally, to discuss some of the possible implications and how a defender of the Quinean concepts might react to the challenge posed by Boolos' result. (shrink)

Composer, conductor, educator, jazz critic, and horn virtuoso, Gunther Schuller here brings together his writings on music. There are numerous articles about jazz, dealing with his favourite figures like Duke Ellington and Ornette Coleman, and also Schuller's concept of the 'Third Stream', the area where jazz and concert music intersect. Other sections deal with the composition and performance of contemporary music, musical education, and musical aesthetics.

In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey’s account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well—including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey’s account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a (...) tension in Ramsey’s account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals. (shrink)

ResumoNo presente texto (“O Eu de Fichte”), no qual identifica duas épocas distintas na história da filosofia concernente ao desenvolvimento da teoria da consciência, D. Henrich volta-se, após caracterizar os componentes de cada período, à teoria da consciência do primeiro Fichte, o da Doutrina da Ciência de 1794, pondo ênfase sobre algumas aporiaspresentes nessa sua primeira formulação, na medida em que Fichte foi o primeiro a encarar o problema da consciência em sua perspectiva, no fundo, mais agônica, deixado sem (...) tratamento pela tradição da filosofia pré-kantiana e kantiana. AbstractIn the present text (Fichte’s Self), in which he identifies two distinct epochs in the history of philosophy concerning the development of the theory of consciousness, D. Henrich turns, after characterizing the components of each period, to the theory of consciousness of the first Fichte, that of the Doctrine of Science of 1794, placing emphasis on some of the aporias present in his first formulation, insofar as Fichte was the first to face the problem of consciousness in its essentially more agonistic perspective, left untreated by the tradition of pre-Kantian and Kantianphilosophy. (shrink)

Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3–14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and (...) urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity. (shrink)

‘Language and End Time’ is a translation of Sections I, IV and V of ‘Sprache und Endzeit’, a substantial essay by Günther Anders that was published in eight instalments in the Austrian journal FORVM from 1989 to 1991 (the full essay consists of 38 sections). The original essay was planned for inclusion in the third (unrealised) volume of The Obsolescence of Human Beings. ‘Language and End Time’ builds on the diagnosis of ‘our blindness toward the apocalypse’ that was advanced in (...) the first volume of The Obsolescence in 1956. The essay asks if there is a language that is capable of making us fully comprehend the looming ‘man-made apocalypse’. In response to this, it offers a critique of philosophical jargon and of the putatively ‘objective’ language of (nuclear) science, which are both dismissed as unsuitable. Sections I, IV and V introduce this core problematic. The selection of this text for inclusion in this special journal issue responds to present-day realities that inscribe Anders’s reflections on nuclear science and the nuclear situation into new contexts. The critique that ‘Language and End Time’ advances resonates with the way in which the (undemocratic) decisions of a few companies and individuals are shaping the future of life on earth. At the same time, the wider stakes of Anders’s turn against the language employed by (weapons) scientists are newly laid bare by the realities and politics of climate change and fake news. In this new context, the language of science is all too readily dismissed as if it were a mere idiom that can be ignored without consequence. It is against the backdrop of a future that is, if anything, more uncertain than at the time of Anders’s writing, that the essay’s reflections on popularisation, the limits of language and the nature of truth gain added significance. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer finale Dialog zwischen Kriemhild und Hagen in der Schlussszene der 39. Aventiure im Nibelungenlied – von der Forschung bis heute irreführend als »2. Hortforderungsszene« bezeichnet – wird als eine psychologisch basierte Finte Hagens gedeutet, die nicht nur eine individuelle Innensphäre der Figur Kriemhilds verifiziert, sondern zugleich das furiose Ende der burgundischen Nibelungen kohärent motiviert. Das Nibelungenlied erscheint in diesem Kontext als literarisches Zeugnis eines zeitgenössischen Ringens um politische Stabilität und traditionelle Wertvorstellungen, das besonders über die Figurenrolle Dietrichs im Spannungsfeld (...) heroischer Gewaltverherrlichung und höfischer Interessenwahrung problematisiert ist.The final dialogue between Kriemhild and Hagen in the closing scene of the Nibelungenlied’s 39th Aventiure – to date falsely designated as the second »Hortforderungsszene« – is here interpreted as a psychological feint of Hagen, which not only verifies the individual interior life of Kriemhild but also provides a coherent motivation for the stirring end of the Burgundian Nibelungen. In this context, the Nibelungenlied appears as a literary testimony of a contemporary struggle about politically stability and traditional moral concepts, which is problematized, first and foremost, via the figure of Dietrich, caught in a conflict between the heroic glorification of violence and the protection of courtly interests. (shrink)

Over the past decades, Patricia Blanchette has developed a sophisticated account of Frege's conception of logic and his views on logical consequence. One of the central components of her interpretation is the idea that Frege's conception of logical consequence is ‘semantically laden’ and not purely formal. The aim of the present paper is to provide precise explications of this as well as related ideas that inform her account, and to discuss their significance for the philosophy of logic in general and (...) Frege's philosophy in particular. (shrink)

In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a “special case” of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is (...) a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**. (shrink)

Electrifying when first delivered in 1973, legendary in the years since, Dieter Henrich's lectures on German Idealism were the first contact a major German philosopher had made with an American audience since the onset of World War II. They remain one of the most eloquent explanations and interpretations of classical German philosophy and of the way it relates to the concerns of contemporary philosophy. Thanks to the editorial work of David Pacini, the lectures appear here with annotations linking them (...) to editions of the masterworks of German philosophy as they are now available. Henrich describes the movement that led from Kant to Hegel, beginning with an interpretation of the structure and tensions of Kant's system. He locates the Kantian movement and revival of Spinoza, as sketched by F. H. Jacobi, in the intellectual conditions of the time and in the philosophical motivations of modern thought. Providing extensive analysis of the various versions of Fichte's Science of Knowledge, Henrich brings into view a constellation of problems that illuminate the accomplishments of the founders of Romanticism, Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, and of the poet Hölderlin's original philosophy. He concludes with an interpretation of the basic design of Hegel's system. (shrink)

The present debate in legal theory is dominated by an unfruitful schism. On the one hand, analytical theories are concerned with the positivity of law, running the risk of missing the law's relation to society. On the other hand, sociological approaches analyze all sorts of social interactions of law, but have developed no conceptual tools to do justice to the autonomy of law. The theory of autopoiesis offers law a chance of getting round the falsely posed alternative between an autonomous (...) rule system or a socially conditioned decision-making process. It is a theory of law that sees the law's autonomy in the self-reproduction of a communication network and understands its relation to society as interference with other autonomous communication networks. Building on the ideas of Humberto Maturana, Heinz von Foerster and Niklas Luhmann, Gunther Teubner uses the concepts of self-organization and autopoiesis to develop a concept of law as a hypercyclically closed social system. This book will stand as a landmark in legal theory and become a standard point of departure in the sociology of law. (shrink)

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is (...) substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. (shrink)

Chisholm's two theories of self-consciousness (before and after 1976) are interpreted and evaluated as well motivated, powerful and instructive attempts to avoid circularities while preserving the phenomenon. They are criticised because of correlative shortcomings: The essentialistic theory allows only the formulation and the ascription of self-consciousness in the first person perspective; the second (epistemic) theory is restricted to the ascription of self-consciousness to others. The first theory suffers furthermore from a hidden circularity whereas the second needs an extension that leads (...) into an infinite regress. (shrink)

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments?Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of (...) human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced.The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project. (shrink)

In this collection comprising four of his most influential essays, Henrich proves himself unique in the conjunction of philosophical acumen, insight, and originality that he brings to Kant interpretation.

In a series of articles dating from 1903 to 1906, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final part of the last article, Frege makes his own proposal as to how the independence of genuine axioms should be proved. Frege contends that independence proofs require the development of a ‘new science’ with its own basic truths. This paper aims to provide a reconstruction of this (...) New Science that meets modern standards and to examine possible problems surrounding Frege’s original proposal. The paper is organized as follows: the first two sections summarize the main points of the Frege–Hilbert controversy and discuss some issues surrounding the problem of independence proofs. Section 3 contains an informal presentation of Frege’s proposal. In section 4 a more detailed reconstruction of Frege’s New Science is set out while section 5 examines what is left out. The concluding section is devoted to a discussion of Frege’s strategy and its significance from a broader perspective. (shrink)

When two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time to produce a joint outcome, they perform a joint action. The perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes that enable individuals to coordinate their actions with others have been receiving increasing attention during the last decade, complementing earlier work on shared intentionality and discourse. This chapter reviews current theoretical concepts and empirical findings in order to provide a structured overview of the state of the art in joint action research. We (...) distinguish between planned and emergent coordination. In planned coordination, agents' behavior is driven by representations that specify the desired outcomes of joint action and the agent's own part in achieving these outcomes. In emergent coordination, coordinated behavior occurs due to perception action couplings that make multiple individuals act in similar ways, independently of joint plans. We review evidence for the two types of coordination and discuss potential synergies between them. (shrink)

Following decades of neglect, the work of the German Jewish philosopher, literary author, cultural critic, and poet Günther Anders (1902–1992) is gaining increasing recognition in the English-speaking world. This translation of “Résistance heute” (Resistance Today) makes one of Anders’s most programmatic and polemical short texts available. Published at the height of his anti-nuclear activism, “Resistance Today” is the written version of a speech Anders delivered in November 1962 upon acceptance of the northwest Italian city of Omegna’s Resistance Prize (other notable (...) recipients included Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon). It first appeared in print in the West German left-wing journal Das Argument in November 1963. Clearly written for the occasion, the text condenses (and often further radicalizes) key premises about the end of history, the amoral character of work, and the continuity between Nazi totalitarianism, the nuclear age and the world of consumerism that are developed in great nuance across a range of books that Anders had recently published. Key co-ordinates include: Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen 1 (The Obsolescence of Human Beings 1, 1956), his groundbreaking critique of technology; Der Mann auf der Brücke (The Man on the Bridge, 1959), a philosophical travel diary occasioned by Anders’s 1958 visit to Japan and his participation at the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Tokyo; Burning Conscience (1961), a correspondence with the American reconnaissance pilot Claude Eatherly, who scouted the target area before the Enola Gay went on to drop the atom bomb on Hiroshima. It seems likely that Burning Conscience, which turned into an international bestseller, occasioned the award of the prize. (shrink)

In his 1960 paper “The concept of moral insight and the Kantian doctrine of the Fact of Reason” (introduced and translated in french by Laura Tavernier), Dieter Henrich argues that Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason—according to which pure reason can not theoretically anticipate or ground the possibility of its practical use—does not betray a lack of systematicity, as post-Kantians reproached it to Kant. After the repeated failures of his own attempts to deduce moral insight from theoretical reason (...) in the “silent decade”, Kant eventually acknowledges that the moral law and our awareness of it cannot be logically derived from a higher principle. The Kantian doctrine of the Fact of Reason thus remains faithful to the phenomenon of moral insight, the paradoxical knowledge of the good, and offers a methodologically adequate answer to the problem that D. Henrich considers to be at the foundation of metaphysics: Kant thinks of a unity of the theoretical and the practical reason that does not imply any derivation of one from the other, nor any subsumption of the two under a unifying principle. (shrink)